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SUMMARYTheoutlookfortwooftheeuroarea’sbestperforming
economiestodate,IrelandandSpain,hasdarkeneddramaticallyrecently
amidseveredownturnsinhousingmarkets.Whatdothesecountries’
experiencestellusaboutthefunctioningofEMU?Thesourceofrapid
growthwasdifferentinthetwocountries,butbothexperiencedlarge
inflowsofmigrantsandsignificanthousingbooms.Againstabackdropof
lowone-size-fits-allinterestratesintheeuroareaafter2002,housing
marketsoverheated.Thesebubbleshaveburstandtheslumpin
residentialinvestmentfromelevatedlevelsthreatenstodragboth
economiesfromonetailofthegrowthdistributiontotheother.
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Euroareagovernmentsshouldmonitor
andprickhousingbubbles.TheGreenspan
doctrinethatpolicymakersshouldnot
tacklebubbleswhentheyareinflatingis
underre-examinationworldwide,butmay
notbeappropriateinanyeventforindi-
vidualEMUmemberstates,whodonot
controltheirinterestrates.Governments
shouldusecountercyclicalchangestothe
housingtaxsystemtodampenfuture
housingcycles.Regulatorypoliciesand
supervisorypracticesshouldbedesigned
topreventalooseningoflendingstan-
dardsandabnormallyfastgrowthincred-
itduringhousingbooms.EUsurveillance
ofmemberstateeconomiesshouldbe
broadenedtoincludeassetmarket
developments.
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ONE OF THE AIMS of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) is to pro-
mote the catching-up of lower
income member states. When the
Maastricht Treaty was signed, the
lower income group of countries
included Greece, Ireland, Spain,
and Portugal. Ireland has experi-
enced a rapid increase in income
per capita since then, while Spain
has also progressed towards
convergence.
EMU contributed to this
convergence by, among other
things, delivering a sharp reduc-
tion in interest rates and greater
access to finance from abroad,
which boosted interest-sensitive
spending such as investment and
facilitated fast growth in credit.
These developments, combined
withotherfeaturesoftheIrishand
Spanish economies such as
demographic factors and the tax
treatment of housing, generated
housing market booms in both
countries.
The rapid growth in Ireland’s econ-
omy was initially driven by a
positive shock to productivity in
the traded sector. The Spanish
expansion, in contrast, reflected a
positive shock to domestic
demand.Inbothcases,theshocks
put upward pressure on the rela-
tive price of non-traded goods and
services,includinghousing
1.
Fromthisperspective,thehousing
booms can be seen as part of the
convergence process, since fast
increases in house prices were to
beexpectedaspricelevelsofnon-
traded goods converge. However,
as in other housing cycles, the
housing booms in Ireland and
Spain turned into disruptive
bubbles, as irrational exuberance
caused price increases to feed
upon themselves and housing val-
uations became unhinged from
fundamentals. The drops in real
interest rates (Figure 1) to inap-
propriately low levels after EMU
entry created difficulties for both
countries.Thesedifficultiesreflect
thewell-known‘Walters’critique’of
one-size-fits-all mone-
tary policy: real
interest rates have
moved in ways that
have been partly
destabilising (Miller
and Sutherland, 1991,
and Kirsanova et al
2006).
These bubbles have now burst,
with damaging consequences for
the Irish and Spanish economies
and potentially for these coun-
tries’ financial systems. The expe-
rience underscores the dangers of
overheating asset markets during
the convergence process in a sin-
glecurrencyarea.
Developments in housing markets
have been a major source of
divergence within EMU over the
pastdecade. Theburstingofthese
bubbles is contributing to
divergence by depressing growth
in Ireland and Spain and threaten-
ing financial stability at the same
time that the German economy is
growing robustly. What are the
implications for policymakers?
The so-called ‘Greenspan doctrine’
that policymakers should not try
totackleassetbubblesandshould
‘focus on policies to
mitigate the fallout
when it occurs’
(Greenspan 1999)
may not be appropri-
ate for individual
member countries of
the euro area that do
not haveindependent
monetary policies. Moreover, in
lightoftheUSsubprimemeltdown,
policymakers and academics are
re-examiningtheprevailinghands-
off approach to asset prices. If
there is a need to find a way to
counteractbubblesmoreeffective-
ly,ineuroareamemberstatesthat
responsibility will lies with nation-
alpolicymakers,notwiththeECB.
The next section examines the
behaviour of housing markets in
Ireland and Spain during EMU and
considers what features and
policies may have facilitated the
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Figure1:Realinterestrates*
‘TheGreenspan
doctrinemaynotbe
appropriatefor
individualEMU
memberstates.’
Source:EurostatandAmeco.*Short-termnominalinterestratesdeflatedbyHICP.
1Theshockshad
differentimplications
forexternalbalances,
however,withIreland’s
currentaccount
balanceremaining
closetozerountil
2005,whileSpain’s
currentaccountdeficit
widenedsharplyto
morethan10percent
ofGDPlastyear.ATAILOFTWOCOUNTRIES
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overheating of housing markets in
these countries. Section 2 dis-
cusses the role of large migration
flows in spurring growth in
housing. Section 3 outlines near-
term policy recommendations for
Ireland and Spain as well as more
generalconclusionsforEMU.
1. HOUSINGMARKET
DEVELOPMENTSUNDEREMU
A major objective of EMU is to
foster economic convergence in
Europe. Ten years after the launch
of the single currency, two of the
three so-called ‘cohesion coun-
tries’ that joined the euro in 1999,
Ireland and Spain, have seen
incomepercapitagrowfasterthan
the euro-area average (Figure 2).
In Ireland’s case, the catching-up
process has been spectacularly
successful. In contrast, the other
cohesion country, Portugal, has
madelittleprogressincatchingup
overthepastdecade.
Membershipofthesinglecurrency
has promoted convergence in
Ireland and Spain mainly through
the elimination of risk premia on
interest rates and the resulting
boost to investment spending.
Increased financial market inte-
gration has boosted capital flows
across euro area countries and
hasfacilitatedeasieravailabilityof
credit to households and
businesses
2.
The boom in residential invest-
ment has led to a doubling of its
share in GDP (Figure 3), directly
contributing to annual growth of
half a percentage point in Spain
and a full percentage point in
Ireland over the 1996-2006
period
3. The surge in investment
was accompanied by soaring
house prices (Figure 4). Other
factors also contributed to the
housing booms, notably sustained
fast growth in disposable income;
population dynamics including
increased immigration flows;
favourable tax treatment of home
ownership; and demand by for-
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Figure2:Convergenceinincomepercapita(EA12average=100)
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2Ahearne,vonHagen
andSchmitz(2008)
provideevidencethat
capitalflowsfromhigh-
incomeeuroarea
economiestolow-
incomeeuroarea
economieshave
increasedsincethecre-
ationoftheeuro.
3WeuseGNPinsteadof
GDPasameasureof
outputforIrelandto
excludethe
supernormalvalue-
addedrecordedinsome
sectorsthataredomi-
natedbyforeignmulti-
nationalcompanies.b
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eigners for retirement homes in
Spain.
Housingmarketsinbothcountries
begantoshowsomesignsofover-
heating around 2002. New home-
building surged to levels well
above estimates of medium-term
housing needs. For example,
assuming that Ireland’s sustain-
able level of residential invest-
ment was closer to 10 percent of
GNP, the rate of investment in
housing since 2002 would have
generated an excess stock of
residential capital equivalent to
about 25 percent of GNP
4. Working
off this surplus will imply a signifi-
cant drop in housing investment,
exert downward pressure on
housepricesandputasubstantial
dragongrowthforseveralyears.
Traditional measures of housing
valuation such as price-to-rent
and price-to-income ratios also
began to signal possible overheat-
ing around 2002 (Figure 5). The
compression of rental yields
appears to be much greater than
can be explained by declining
interestrates.Thisimpliesthatthe
unusually high level of house
pricesrelativetorentswasmainly
supported by large expected
capitalgains.
Against a backdrop of rising
interest rates in 2006 and 2007,
house prices and residential
investment began to fall. The con-
traction in home building is
expectedtosubtractdirectlyabout
four percentage points from GDP
growthinIrelandthisyear.
What factors contributed to over-
heating?
Developmentsinfinancialmarkets
over the past year have highlight-
ed the problems of asset price
bubbles, especially bubbles in
house prices. Under certain
conditions,boomsinhouseprices,
though initially justified by eco-
nomicfundamentals,canturninto
price bubbles in which expecta-
tions of future gains become the
main driver of current prices and
housing values move out of kilter
with conditions in the rest of the
economy.
Conditions appear to have been
conducive for housing bubbles in
IrelandandSpain.
• Strong growth in domestic
demand, productivity growth in
the traded goods sectors, and
the convergence of price levels
have generated inflation levels
in Ireland and Spain that have
exceeded the euro area since
1999.Moreover,thestrongeco-
nomic performance of Ireland
andSpainrepresentedasignifi-
cant divergence from the euro
area economic cycle. As a
result, real interest rates were
inappropriately low for both
these economies. O’Leary
(2004) provides evidence
basedonTaylorrulesthatmuch
higher interest rates were war-
ranted by prevailing economic
conditions (Figure 6). Low real
interest rates reinforced the
boom in interest-sensitive
spending, particularly in con-
sumer spending and the
housingmarket.
• Ireland and Spain have gener-
ous tax provisions for owner
occupied housing (van den
Noord, 2005). Both countries
have generous interest
deductibility systems for
owner-occupied housing and
tax breaks for profits made on
thesaleofprimaryresidences.
2. WHATROLEDIDMIGRATION
PLAY?
Labour mobility is rightly regarded
as a key channel by which a large
currency area can cope with
asymmetric shocks (Mundell
1961). Accordingly, one might
have expected the dynamic
growth of Spain and Ireland to
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Figure5:Houseprice,rentsandincomes
4Thisfigurefor
medium-term
residentialinvestment
isinlinewithrecent
projectionsofhousing
needsinEconomicand
SocialResearch
Institute(2008).The
resultingestimateof
theexcessstockof
residentialcapitalis
consistentwithdata
fromCensus2006that
therewere266,000
vacantdwellingsin
IrelandinApril2006,
representing15
percentofthetotal
housingstock.Manyof
thesedwellingsare
thoughttobeinvest-
mentproperties.
Source:OECD.ATAILOFTWOCOUNTRIES
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have been smoothed via the
labour mobility channel in view of
the accelerated immigration
inflows that the two countries
have experienced in recent years
(seeFigure7).
However, the matter is more com-
plicated when a local economic
boomisaccompaniedandtosome
extent fuelled by a rapid increase
in house prices. To understand
why, it is instructive to first reflect
onthelikelyimpactofimmigration
on the fundamental price of
housing. On the demand side,
immigrationincreasesthenumber
one extreme, it would be
conceivable that a massive and
temporary inflow of foreign con-
struction workers who live in
cramped conditions to maximise
their savings and plan to return
back home once the construction
is completed would only marginal-
ly increase rental prices in the
short run while substantially
reducing housing prices over a
longer time horizon simply by
reducing construction costs and
expanding the supply of housing.
At the other extreme, there would
be few construction workers
among the immigrants and in any
event there might be tight zoning
laws in place so as to make an
expansion in housing supply diffi-
cult no matter what. In that case,
housing prices might increase
substantially in response to
immigration.
In his recent and careful study of
the house price impact of
immigration on US metropolitan
areas, Saiz (2007) finds that
immigration increases house
prices. He estimates that a an
inflow of one percent of immi-
grants increases rents and the
value of houses by roughly one
percent. Thus, the impact of
immigration on house prices is
estimated to be several times
stronger than any positive or neg-
ative impact of immigration on
native incomes
5. Goldman Sachs
(2007) estimate that a one
percent increase in the number of
householdsraiseshousepricesby
eight percent in the short run and
by six percent once the house-
building has responded to higher
pricesoverthelongerterm.
Overall,itthereforeappearsunlike-
ly that the net effect of
of people requiring housing in the
location in question. Thus, even if
immigrants initially accept more
crowded housing conditions than
natives, they will increase
demandforhousing.Onthesupply
side, immigrant construction
workers can help to alleviate
capacity constraints in a booming
construction sector provided that
construction workers are the bind-
ing constraint. Thus, immigration
can help to increase the supply of
housing.
Ultimately, it is an empirical ques-
tion which effect will dominate. At
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
G
r
e
e
c
e
S
p
a
i
n
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
percentagepoints
Figure6:Doesonesizefitall?ActualminusTaylorRuleinterestrates(2004)
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5SeeBorjas(2003),
Longhiet al(2005),
OttavianoandPeri
(2006).
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immigration would take pressure
off a booming housing market.
This is the fundamental reason
why the general argument that
labourmobilitywillhelptoprevent
overheating in a fast-growing
member of a currency union is
unlikely to fully apply in a boom
that is to an important extent
fuelledbyhouseprices.
In addition, one can attempt to
speculate on the role of
immigration in a housing price
bubble where real estate prices
have risen well above fundamen-
tals. One channel by which impor-
tant migration flows might help to
sustain a bubble is by adding an
important dimension of specula-
tive expectations. Specifically,
there could be a tendency to ratio-
naliseexcessivelyhighreal estate
pricesbylong-termlinearextrapo-
lation of current migratory trends,
underestimating the pro-cyclical
and therefore mean-reverting
component of immigration. For
example,theextremeupwardrevi-
sions in long-term population pro-
jections for Spain until 2050 (see
Figure 8) are largely driven by
changes in assumptions about
future net immigration rates. But
of course such (potentially
flawed) expectations about future
population trends directly feed
through to current real estate
prices.
Furthemore, once real estate
prices have reached bubble levels
largely in excess of what would be
justified by reasonable assump-
tions about the future, one key
channel of welfare
losses as a result of
thepricebubbleisthe
excess diversion of
resources into the
constructionsector.If
the price elasticity of
supply is reduced
through the ready
availabilityofimmigrantconstruc-
tion workers, the wasteful excess
constructionactivityislikelytobe
larger than it would have been
without immigration. Whether this
greatersupplyresponseinthereal
estate sector will also accelerate
theburstingofthebubble(thereby
at least shortening the time until
the bubble bursts) is difficult to
predict and ultimately depends on
the mechanisms that are driving
the bubble expectations. Hence,
even the availability of cheap
labour for construction may have
ambiguous welfare effects in a
housingbubbleeconomy.
Summingup,itwasclearlyreason-
able that real estate prices have
increased substantially in Ireland
and Spain not only in response to
increased real incomes and low
interest rates but also in response
to immigration driven by genuine
economic opportuni-
ty. However, it
appears also clear
that the problems of
divergence between
Ireland and Spain
(whose rapid growth
was in part driven by
therealestatesector)
and the rest of the Euro area
should not have been expected to
be smoothed by a reliance on the
labour mobility channel alone.
Price misalignments and
distortions may even have been
temporarily exacerbated by
immigration.
While these arguments do not
imply that the surge in migration
to Ireland and Spain has been
harmful overall, they do suggest
that immigration has perhaps
been less beneficial to the local
economy than was hoped at the
height of the economic boom. And
now that the bubble has burst, the
practical question arises to what
extent immigrants especially in
the construction sector will con-
tribute to the adjustment by
onward or return migration and to
what extent they will move into
unemploymentorgrowingsectors
.
‘Workingoffthe
surpluswillputa
substantialdragon
housinginvestment
forseveralyears.’
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3. POLICYCONCLUSIONS
Developments in housing markets
in Ireland and Spain raise
questions about how policymak-
ers should respond in the near-
term to support economic activity
in the face of housing slumps. But
the experiences also raise boarder
questionsaboutthefunctioningof
the euro area and how national
policy frameworks should be
adapted to allow member
countries to respond more appro-
priately to asymmetric shocks.
These lessons may be particularly
relevant for new catching-up
countriesintheeuroarea.
In the near term, how should poli-
cymakers in Ireland and Spain
respondtotheburstingofhousing
bubblesinthosecountries?
• Policymakers should not pre-
vent house prices from declin-
ing to more sustainable levels.
House prices will eventually
decline to levels that bring the
supplyanddemandforhousing
back into equilibrium. Falling
prices and the lack of demand
implythatsomepropertydevel-
opers will go bankrupt.
Governments should not try to
prevent such a shakeout in the
industry.
• As home-building contracts,
governments should support
non-housingpartsoftheecono-
my to maintain growth.
Increased infrastructural
spending might be particularly
useful, because such spending
would fill a gap in demand and
provide employment to laid-off
construction workers.
Moreover, better (public) trans-
port infrastructure may help to
mitigate future house price
bubbles by reducing the
premium on centrally located
housing.
• Governments should avoid
actions that would add to the
supply of housing in the near
term. For example, the Spanish
government has approved
measures to promote the con-
struction of social housing at a
rate of 150,000 new houses
per year, in part to support the
housing industry. Such meas-
ures may worsen the inventory
overhang problem and prolong
theadjustmentprocess.
• Insulation investments in
residential housing have long
beenrecognisedasaneconom-
ically attractive way to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions with
particularly short payback
periods on investment.
Therefore, relatively small sub-
sidies for such insulation
activities might go a long way
towards stimulating such insu-
lation investments to improve
the existing housing stock. The
introduction of such subsidies
might give rise to a double divi-
dend of environmental benefits
plus a cushioning of the
requiredbutpainfulcontraction
of the construction sector. Both
Ireland and Spain already have
policy initiatives in this regard
that could be built upon and
expanded
6.
Wealsodrawmoregeneralconclu-
sions for EMU. Over the past
decade, house price increases the
euro area as a whole have been
unremarkable (Figure 4) and
therefore not a major factor for the
ECB. However, there have been
local housing bubbles that have
added to divergence in the euro
area and now threaten economic
prospectsandfinancialstabilityin
some member states. Our focus is
on measures that would make
national economies less vulnera-
bletodestabilisinghousingbooms
andbusts.
• Euro area governments should
prick housing bubbles using
countercyclical taxation of
housing.WheneverECBinterest
rates become inappropriately
low for a member state, for
example,aggressivereductions
intaxbreaksonhousingshould
be introduced to offset the
stimulus coming from ECB
policy. Mortgage interest relief
could be eliminated. A tax on
interest payments for flexible-
rate mortgages might also be
called for, as well as increases
inpropertytaxandcapitalgains
tax on owner-occupied homes.
These measures could be
reversed when the ECB pushes
interestratesbackup.
• Housing booms associated
with credit booms are particu-
larly damaging (Mishkin,
2008). In Ireland and Spain,
financial liberalisation and
increasingbankingcompetition
have contributed to lower mort-
gageinterestratesandfacilitat-
ed access to credit by house-
holds. The process of liberalisa-
tion and further competition
hasalsoinducedthecreationof
new mortgage instruments
such as 100 percent (or even
higher) mortgage products,
interest-only mortgages and
mortgages with longer repay-
ment periods. This has resulted
in a rapid expansion of credit
6InApril2008,theIrish
governemntannounced
theintroductionofa
newHomeEnergy
SavingSchemethat
subsidizesenergy
efficientinvestmentsin
residentialhousingwith
asubsidyvolumeofini-
tially€5mbutpoten-
tiallyupto€100m.ATAILOFTWOCOUNTRIES
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(Figure 9). These experiences
suggest that banking regula-
tions should be used more
forcefully to dampen bubbles.
Inparticular,regulationsshould
address banking practices that
contribute to credit-driven
bubbles and perhaps should
allowbanksupervisorstoplaya
counter-cyclicalrole.
• There are no incentives from
the euro area system for
national governments to lean
against the wind of housing
bubbles. There should be,
because housing markets are
so large and housing busts are
always very disruptive. A coun-
try with a housing boom with
easily meet SGP rules on fiscal
targets since booms boost
government revenues. As rec-
ommended in the recent
Commission (2008) report on
the lessons from the first ten
years of the euro, a more
effectivesurveillanceofmacro-
economic developments is
needed at the euro area level.
This surveillance should not be
concerned by budgetary
developments alone, but recog-
nise that housing market
bubbles and their conse-
quences can severely hamper
thesmoothfunctioningofEMU.
For this reason, they are a
matterofcommonconcern.
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Figure9:ResidentialmortgagedebttoGDP(%)
Source:EuropeanMortgageFederationandBruegelcalculations.